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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

'

Plainti fl-Respondent,
Case No.

vs.

12621

D'V AIN HATCH,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

OF THE KIND OF CASE
Appellant, and 'Villiam Leslie Hailey and Bobby
Burr were arrested in connection with a burglary of
Rust's Coin Shop, Salt Lake City, Utah. Burr was not
tried. He confessed to the burglary, but because he was
on probation for a prior offense, the probation was simply
ren>ked (R 64, L 7-28). Appellant and Hailey were
b:Jth bound over to District Court for trial. Appellant
was tried, but trial was continued as to Hailey.
1

DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT
Appellant was found guilty of second degree burglary by jury verdict.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Rust Coin Shop is at 311 South
Salt
Lake City, Utah. At 6:40 a.m., November 22, 1970,
Peak Alarm Company received a burglary signal for
Rust Coin. Peak's owner, Jerry Howe, was on duty
and immediately notified the police and Alvin Rust,
owner of the coin shop (P 51, L23 - P 53,Ll). At
6 :44 a.m., the ADT Alarm Company also received a
burglary signal from Rust Coin. ADT's employee, Robert Politowicz, called the police and dispatched another
employee, Richard Boyce, to Rust Coin. (P 53, Ll428). Rust Coin had the two alarm systems in service.
ADT was hooked up to the safe, and Peak Alarm was
set to give a signal when a rug was stepped on in front
of the safe. Both alarms were "silent," giving no warning inside the coin shop. (P 52, L4-10, P 54, Ll-14).
Mr. Boyce arrived at Rust Coin at 6 :47 a.m., to
find that Salt Lake City Police officers had arrived just
before him. (P. 56 L 1-14), and saw a man, I-Iailey,
walking up the street.
2

lHr. lloyce opened the door to Rust Coin and entered with the officers who were there ( P 56, L 12).

A hole was found in the plasterboard wall that
diYi<le<l Rust Coin from the shop adjoining on the
north, the Optical Shop.
Boyce left the shop to
see if the person who had been on the street was still
in sight, went back in the shop to report that he wasn't,
and then went back out of the shop. Another police car
was arriving, and Boyce walked up to it as it pulled
up (P 60, L 17-25). He had almost reached the curb
when he noticed two men, one the appellant, in the
doorway by the Optical Shop (P 56, L 12-P57, L 26).
Burr ran. Appellant remained where he was and was
arrested (P 74, L 25-27). Officers found the man,
Hailey, who had been on the street and arrested him
also.
The doorways of the Optical Shop and Rust Coin
are within two or thre feet of each other (P 57, L 27-30).
No one, including Boyce, saw appellant come out
of either door or saw either door move ( P 62, L 25p 63, L 4).
Mr.
and the officers who were first on the
scene spent three minutes at the scene, with approximately two of those minutes inside Rust Coin, before
the appellant was seen ( P 63, L 9-22).
The reason l\Ir. Boyce might have missed seeing
appellant as Boyce came out the door, is that there
is a large post centered between the two doorways. The

3

doorways are recessed a few steps back from the sidewalk. The post is between the doorways and the sidewalk. It is roughly four feet wide and two and one-half
to three feet deep ( P 70, L 15-27). A person on one
side of the post could be overlooked by a person on
the other side (Ex. 8-D).
Ben Smith was the officer who was pulling up when
Boyce came out of the Coin Shop. He found the lock
of the Optical Shop was broken ( P 69, L 13-27) . He
found a pair of plaster dust covered work gloves
abandoned in the Optical Shop near the hole in the wall
(P 72, L 25-P 73, L 9).
Officers Greenhalgh, Mitchell and Timmerman
had entered the Coin Shop with Mr. Boyce ( P 56, L
12-29). They saw the hole in the wall to the Optical
Shop, burglar tools by the safe and heard noises from
the Optical Shop. Officer Timmerman went through
the hole while Officer Greenhalgh went out to the street.
No one was found in the Optical Shop. This took about
30 seconds after hearing the noise (P 81, Ll6-P 82,
LIB).
Officer Paloukas testified that he talked to appellant at the jail and appellant said, "'Vhat is there to
say? We got caught," and refused to talk saying he
wanted an attorney (P 89, L5-21).
On cross, the officer admitted he made no mention
of the statement to any other officer, didn't get it in
writing or witnessed, wasn't positive if it was or wasn't
4

in his report, and was repeating the comment as best
he could, but purely on a recollection basis ( P 90, L24p 99, LIO). Only minor changes of language or of a
shade of meaning, would render the statement innocuous such as, "\Vhat is there to say? I'm caught ( arrested). I want an attorney." The statement was not
made under the press of circumstances. It was made
a fulJ day after the arrest ( P 102, L6-21).
Greenhalgh, owner of the Optical Shop, testified that )Ir. Hailey came to his shop two weeks before
to "case" the site ( P 65, L9-30).
The negative factors in the case are: (I) Appellant's clothes were taken into custody by the police.
Notwithstanding the large hole in the plasterboard wall
and the plaster dust covered gloves ( P 77, L3-9) , there
was no evidence of plaster dust on defendant's clothes
nor on his person. ( 2) No fingerprints connected defendant to the burglary nor the burglar tools. ( 3) He
was not seen inside either shop, nor coming out. Although the time was about 6 :45 a.m., the location was
Third South and Main Street in Salt Lake City, only
two doors from the corner ( P 72, L2-7). The officers
and alarm system men all went inside the coin shop for
a period of about two minutes and came out as the next
poJiceman, Officer Smith was just arriving ( P 56,
LI2-29; P Go L9-22; P 69 LI3-27; P 81 Ll6; P 82
L 18). A passerby could easily have been attracted to
the '.ocene during this period. ( 4) No evidence connected
defendant to Burr or Hailey.
5

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JURY \VAS Il\IPROPERL Y
STRUCTED ON REASONABLE DOUBT.

IN-

The case is one where the state clearly had facts
sufficient to go to the jury. The case was not air tight.
Defendant could have been a passerby, or have been
with Burr and Hailey, but not been a participant in
the crime. State v. Laub, 102 U 402, 131 P2d 805.
He was not caught in the act. There was a hole in the
plasterboard wall between the two shops which was
large enough for men to crawl through. There was debris
and plaster dust. Notwithstanding this, and defendant's
arrest at the scene, neither his clothes nor person had
any plaster.
In this context, the court gave the following mstruction on reasonable doubt:
As I have heretofore told you, the burden is
upon the State of Utah to prove the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The term "reasonable doubt" means a doubt that is based on
reason and one which is reasonable in view of
all of the evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt
and not a doubt that is merely possible, fanciful,
or imaginary, for almost everything relating to
human affairs may be open to some possible
doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable persons would have from a fair and impartal consideration of all of the evidenc.e. ancl
it must fairly, naturally and reasonably anse out
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of the evidence given i11 the case and/ or the lack
of evi<lence in the case. (Instruction 11, P 31).
Defendant's objections to the instruction were made
known to the court before the jury was instructed,
and renewed in the Exceptions (P 113, L 3-P 114,
L 1.5). The court ha<l the standard, stock, instruction
before it, but chose to use its own, above, form ( P 113,
L 20-27).
The instruction is short, but still uses "reason" and
"reasonable" eight times.
It gives a series of negative tests. The doubt must
not be "possible, fanciful or imaginary."
It stresses that all human matters are open to some
possible doubt, but that this categorically, is not of the
stature of a reasonable doubt. It requires that the
reasonable doubt must arise fairly and naturally from
the evidence.

All of the tests are, in effect, conditions precedent
to the reasonable doubt.
That guilt must be established beyond a reasonable
doubt is a matter of statutory mandate. 77-31-5, UCA,
1953.

A definition should not use the word defined. However, in two early Utah cases the undefined phrase
"reasonable doubt" was deemed acceptable. State v.
l\IcCune, 16 U 170, 51 P 818. State v. Neel, 23 U 541
65 P 4<94. Since then, though, the definitions used in the
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McCune opinion have become standard in Utah abiding conviction and certainty sufficient to act on in
one's own weighty affairs.
It is not that the McCune phrases are hallowed,
but they do explain the concept. If not used, other
metaphors equally apt would be needed. If the trial
court disliked the accepted definition, it failed to improve
on it, by constantly calling the jury back to reason as
the definition of reasonable.

The self defining concept was modified, or at least
received disapproval, in State v. Overton, 55 U 230,
234, 158 P 364. There an instruction stating that a reasonable doubt was a doubt for which there was a reason,
was held to be "not illuminating." However, the instruction contained six "correct propositions", so the
error was not deemed prejudicial.
The latest Utah case speaking on reasonable doubt
seems to go, by logical inference, entirely past the idea
that reasonable doubt might be self defining. State v.
Sullivan, 6 U 2d 119, 370 P 2d 212, was an appeal
based on the theory that the evidence was inadequate
to sustain the conviction. The court noted that the
determination would be made by the court only if the
evidence were such that a reasonable doubt would haw
to arise from it. Short of that the determination was
'
for the jury. The critical point is that the jury must
know just what it should do, as it is so utterly supreme
in the area of factual detennination. The court nffinned
the guilty verdict, stating "all that is required is that the
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jurors ha \'e an abi<liHg conviction of the defendant's
guilt such as they would be willing to act on in the more
weighty and important matters relating to their own
affairs." The court rightly required that the jury should
understand reasonable doubt and apply it properly.
For the reviewing court to have the degree of certainty in the rightness of the process by which the jury
reached its verdict in Sullivan, the court had to know
that the jury knew what it was doing. To assume this,
there must be a basis for the court's faith, a known
standard that the jury met. The standard is supplied
by the court giving the law in an instruction. In the case
now before the court what standard did the jury apply?
Not abiding conviction. That wasn't given. What then?
'i\T e don't know.Not knowing, we can't begin to say that
the jury arrived at a verdict based on proper standards
of proof.
The attorney who strays from the law as given
in the instructions has neither foundation nor credibility in his argument to the jury. He must be able to
say to the jury, "If you think the accused may be guilty,
or is even probably guilty, you may not convict. The
sanctions of the criminal law are too severe for this.
You may find him guilty if, but only if, you find his
guilt proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Now then,
this is what a reasonable doubt is ... " At this point
appellant's counsel was speechless. He had no standard,
no comparisons, no basis, by which he could make the
concept of reasonable doubt alive and understood in the
jurors' minds.
9

During his exceptions to the instructions, appellant's
counsel summed up his frustration by stating to the
court, "I had no test to give to the jury." ( P 114,
L 9-15).
"Reasonable doubt" is a legal concept, not a dictionary term. Its heart lies in its weight-the degree
of certainty of evidence required to outweigh it. Here,
the issue in the case was simply the weight of evidence,
and the instruction failed to illuminate, or give any
standard by which the jury could determine if a reasonable doubt existed.
The error is the same as if, in a negligence case,
the jury received no definition of negligence.

CONCLUSION
Appellant prays a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
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SAMUEL KING and
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Attorneys for Appellant
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